

ESTONIAN RESCUE BOARD

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Ministry of Justice
Tõnismägi 5A
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Your: 14th August 2007 No. 1-2-10/8418

Our: 4th September 2007 No. 6.1-5-25/828

About planning the new Tallinn Prison

In reply to your letter No. 1-2-10/8418 from 14th August 2007 we hereby explain the procedure for carrying out the risk analysis arising from the Emergency Preparedness Act and reply to the questions posed in the letter.

According to the provisions of § 8 of the Emergency Preparedness Act, ministries shall perform risk assessment in order to identify the emergencies which may occur in their area of government. This means that a ministry shall perform risk assessment concerning the risks that may occur in its area of government, such risks may in the case of a house of detention involve, for example, mass disorder in the house of detention or group escape of imprisoned persons. According to § 26, a separate obligation for performing risk assessment is imposed on undertakings, whose enterprises are dangerous and such risk analysis shall be performed pursuant to the Chemicals Act. Thus, performing risk analysis upon building a prison is not required according to the Emergency Preparedness Act.

However, this does not mean that upon designing the prison the dangers connected with dangerous enterprises located near the prison and especially with enterprises liable to be affected by major accidents, or their risk analysis, which the enterprises perform pursuant to the Chemicals Act, should not be considered.

The Rescue Board has at its disposal the following documentation with regard to the enterprises located near the prison:

- a) Rescue plan of AS Termoil Terminal;
- b) Safety report of AS Trendgate;
- c) Risk analysis of AS Trendgate Iru oil products terminal and of oil pipeline exploitation of Iru-Maardu harbour.

On the basis of the abovementioned documents, Harju County Risk Analysis of 2005, risk analysis expert assessment of major accidents with danger of emergency of Maardu City Vana-Narva Road 13 land unit performed by the North Estonian Regional Rescue Centre on 9th April 2007, the Rescue Board states the following.

The mazut containers and tanks in the terminal of AS Termoil (Vana-Narva Road 27A) do not pose direct danger to the future Tallinn Prison, as the area of the detailed plan remains outside the danger zone of the accidents that might possibly happen with the mazut containers and tanks.

AS Termoil has the licence and right to handle crude oil but at the moment they are not exercising that right. Upon boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) of the crude oil tanks on the railway trestle of AS Termoil, people who are outside the buildings on the territory of the new prison might remain near the external border of the danger zone of medium danger (500 m). An accident of greater damage may cause within 15-20 seconds second-degree burn on the people on the external border of the area. The buildings of the planned Tallinn Prison are not directly threatened by the short-term thermal energy impulse of the BLEVE of AS Termoil crude oil railway tank. Whereas, the occurrence of an accident of maximum damage is unlikely, as there are respective extinguishing and cooling systems at AS Termoil, which will start working upon possible ignition. At the same time, if the building materials mentioned in this letter are used upon building the prison, the impact of thermal radiation will not exceed 10 kW/m² and people will not be injured in the case of an accident of maximum consequences.

The planned Tallinn Prison shall also be located in the danger zone of the pipeline of AS Trendgate but the danger can be reduced by implementing respective building measures (relocating the pipeline).

The Harju County Risk Analysis is of advisory nature upon preparing the detailed plan as it is not possible to impose restrictions on building in the danger zone of dangerous enterprises on the basis of the degree of the risks assessed in it.

In the estimation of the Rescue Board, the adoption of a detailed plan cannot be guided by maximum risks, as their occurrence is unlikely. According to established practices, the fact that a building is located in danger zone is not a circumstance hindering the building process and it is a conscious risk which the founder of the prison is willing to take.

At the same time, the Rescue Board recommends to train prison staff to act in the case of an accident for maximum risk management, in order to guarantee quick and effective provision of emergency medical care and sheltering or evacuation. Particular stress should be placed on informing people and on developing emergency plans and checking them in the course of trainings. What should be paid the most attention to with regard to the enterprises near the prison is the prevention of the start of fire on their territory and guaranteed quick exchange of information and cooperation in case of emergency.

In order to reduce the impact of external environment in the course of further planning, the Rescue Board recommends taking the standard EVS 812-5:2005 Fire Safety of Constructions Part 5: Fire Safety of Oil Terminals and Gas Stations, which legally regulates the respective field, as a basis upon relocating the product pipeline of AS Trendgate. The production belt of the product pipeline can be reduced by implementing construction measures (placing into land, building bund walls), in which case a safety range of 5-10 metres would be sufficient.

In order to reduce the impact of external environment, the Rescue Board suggests using materials reducing thermal radiation, such as concrete, glass that reduces thermal radiation, and other fireproof materials at least on the side open to impact, and not to plan there any places in which people gather. A separate concrete barrier between the prison and the dangerous enterprise also helps reduce thermal radiation. Specific construction conditions and choice of building materials should be agreed upon in the course of approving the design project submitted for construction licence.

On the whole, the Estonian Rescue Board cannot see any consequences arising from the activities of AS Termoil and AS Trendgate, which would prevent the Maardu City Government from adopting the detailed plan for the new Tallinn Prison.

To sum up, we announce that the Rescue Board is open for multilateral negotiations with regard to the given topic and will be looking forward to initiative by AS E.O.S.

Sincerely yours,

/Signature/

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